Political economy theory expects that changes in macroeconomic governance are often catalyzed by institutional factors, such as partisanship, elections, or IMF conditionality. I challenge and contextualize this view by incorporating the role of technocratic advisors into a domestic policymaking framework. I contend that presidents from countries with crisis legacies are more likely to appoint mainstream economists that pursue budget discipline. Employing an originally constructed dataset, the Index of Economic Advisors, I
"Practical men, who believe themselves to be quite exempt from any intellectual in uences, are usually slaves of some defunct economist. " -John Maynard Keynes What explains the sustained commitment to budget discipline among many Latin American governments notwithstanding the general level of regional disillusionment with`Washington Consensus' reforms? 1 For example, the Bolivian government is well known for its rebuff of Western governance models, including President Evo Morales' nationalization of the natural gas industry. In the realm of national scal affairs, however, its Economy Minister Luis Alberto Arce often sounds like an IMF poster child when touting the importance of "recurring budget surpluses, a prudent scal attitude," and "defeating in ation" to the country's economic model. 2 Moreover, scal rectitude has endured beyond the global commodity correction, with the Bolivian government maintaining an average primary budget surplus of almost one percent of GDP since 2008. What accounts for the persistence of macroeconomic discipline?
In this paper, I develop a new theory about the political legacy of economic crises. I argue that macroeconomic policy choices are a product of crisis histories. Latin American politicians operate according to standard political logic, assuming voters respond to economic conditions, but their incentives change when their countries have experienced devastating economic crises. The political impetus to protect voters from negative income shocks can be as strong as the political incentive to pad their earnings.
In a region like Latin America that is characterized by considerable economic volatility, politicians are keenly aware of the political turnover induced by negative income shocks. They have coincided with the ouster of about two-fths of the sixteen Latin American presidents that were removed early from of ce since 1978 (see Hochstetler and Samuels 2011) . Hyperin ation, in particular, has yielded some of the most severe shocks historically, rupturing the domestic price system, quashing popular living standards, and erasing as much as 30 to 90 percent of earning power in in ation-ridden countries. 3 I contend that presidents seek to minimize the risks of such traumatic crises re-emerging during their administration, invoking historical analogies about the lessons of hyperin ation. I thus expect politicians from in ation-crisis countries to pursue scal discipline, based on the mainstream economic lesson derived from such crises that high scal de cits are in ationary (Sargent and Wallace, 1981) . International nancial institutions (Thacker 1999; Vreeland 2003) and global nancial markets (Frieden 1991; Mahon 1996;  1 Scholars attribute the left's rise to disillusionment with Western reforms, and the ongoing structural problems of poverty, inequality, and crime (Mainwaring, 2006; Corrales, 2008; Weyland, Madrid, and Hunter 2010; Levitsky and Roberts, 2011 However, a nation's understanding of its own crisis-history is an important determinant of whether or not they heed such advice. Hyperin ation helps explains Latin American governments more steadfast commitment to budget austerity relative to other reforms. Austerity, or the commitment to such scal discipline even during hard times, 4 helped many countries successfully tame hyperin ation. By comparison, alternative heterodox interventions, featuring the combination of expansionary scal policies along with wage and price controls, were largely discredited after failing to control runaway in ation.
In the years following hyperin ation, Latin American governments have experienced other varieties of domestic crises, including protracted periods of unemployment that have temporarily raised the political saliency of heterodox interventions. Ultimately, however, their policy resilience has been limited by their crisis roots, which have not disrupted the price system and the economy as gravely as in ation crises.
How are such differences in economic ideas channeled and sustained through the political system? I contend that there are two primary pathways: politicians and technocrats. First, presidents may prioritize scal sustainability within their overall economic agenda. In crisis-scarred countries, the persistence of in ation-sensitivity among the electorate and businesses raises the political appeal of mainstream policy solutions that use scal discipline as a conduit for in ation-controlled growth.
They may also appoint technocrats, or ministers with specialized training in economics to provide such governance. In fact, there has been a vefold increase in technocrats serving as key members of Latin American presidential teams since 1970. 5 Such technocrats rst emerged in the wake of the 1980's debt crisis, when politicians hoped such expertise would help assuage foreign investors' concerns about economic turmoil undercutting their pro tability (Schneider 1998) .
Given their powerful position in presidential cabinets, technocrats are an important transmission mechanism for explaining policy choices, but have received less attention compared to such other channels as elections and partisanship. While a burgeoning literature on ministerial turnover (Amorim Neto 2006; MartinezGallardo 2012; Martinez-Gallardo 2014; Camerlo and Pérez-Liñán 2015a; Camerlo and Pérez-Liñán 2015b) examines how institutions and critical events shape near-term cabinet changes, this study explores the extent to which crisis memories can yield sustained ideological shifts in ministerial composition.
In light of their status as non-career politicians (Alexiadou 2015) , technocrats' professional training should allow them to adequately diagnose economic problems (Dargent 2014) . However, in line with the Keynesian wisdom above, they are not exempt from ideological or political in uences (Grindle 1977; Camp 1985; Dominguez et. al. 1997) . In in ation-ridden countries, crises have moved politicians and technocrats closer to the economic center, prioritizing in ation control through scal discipline.
In testing these theoretical priors, my analysis proceeds in two stages. I rst examine the effect of in ation crises on ministers' ideological orientation, before exploring how crises affect politicians' scal policy choices both directly, and indirectly through ministerial appointments. I focus on scal governance because a government's priorities are re ected in its national budget, just as a rm or household's preferences are conveyed through its balance sheet. Finally, I examine these claims in Latin America, a region that is ideally suited for this analysis because of its considerable variation in in ation crisis legacies -about onehalf of its countries have experienced a severe in ation crisis historically (Table A .7 in the online appendix).
During the rst stage of this analysis, I also build on research that shows that policymakers' education is a proxy for their policy preferences (Chwieroth 2007; Nelson 2014a; Nelson 2014b; and Alexiadou 2015) . In order to operationalize the policy orientation of key members of presidential economic teams, I employ a unique, novel dataset, dubbed the Index of Economic Advisors. This index characterizes the policy preferences of economic advisors (mainstream vs. heterodox) over the last half century, based on their professional background and education credentials. To my knowledge, it's the rst index of its kind to incorporate Latin American universities, which are also classi ed by ideological orientation through a series of in-country surveys of Latin America economists from 2015-16.
Employing cross-national data from sixteen Latin American countries from 1961-2011, I nd that hyperin ation histories are often associated with governments that have more mainstream economic advisors and greater scal discipline than their non-crisis counterparts. These empirical results may help explain Latin America's well-known pattern of procyclical scal spending (Gavin and Perotti, 1997; Pinto, 2010) , where downturns tend to coincide with sustained periods of budget austerity, which can limit government's ability to effectively respond to business cycle uctuations (Blyth, 2013) .
These ndings also mark a notable departure from the developed country literature on macroeconomic partisanship. In contrast to traditional models of the economy that expect a partisan split on in ation-control policies that favor businesses (Hibbs, 1977; Bartels, 2008) , these ndings show that transformative national events like economic shocks can blur traditional partisan differences, contributing to the lack of ideology 3 in party systems (Roberts and Wibbels, 1999; Lupu, 2014) . That said, this macroeconomic consensus is distinct from micro-level dimensions, such as privatization or public investment, where scholars have found a closer link between traditional partisanship and regulatory outcomes (Murillo, 2009; Boix, 1998) .
This investigation also offer new insights for studies examining globalization, neoliberalism, and the Latin American left, which have found considerable variation in the extent of government intervention in developing economies. On one side of these debates, scholars contend that economic integration (Rudra, 2002) , global markets (Mahon, 1996; Mosley, 2000; Wibbels, 2006) , and international institutions (Thacker, 1999; Vreeland, 2003; Winters, 2010; Dietrich, 2013) have contributed to a retrenchment of Keynesian-style countercyclical scal policies and social safety nets. In support of this view, scholars nd that a variety of factors, including a weak labor movement (Roberts, 2002) , party-brand dilution (Lupu, 2015) , strong business interests (Thacker, 2000; Schneider 2004; Fair eld, 2010) , centrist and non-economic voters (Baker and Greene, 2011; Hellwig 2014) , and reform-seeking politicians (Corrales, 2000) helped facilitate a broadbased acceptance of this neoliberal consensus (Stokes, 2001; Murillo, 2002; Levitsky, 2003) . Other scholars, however, nd that neoliberal reforms have not been uniform. Rather, many countries with import substitution industrialization legacies (ISI) have crafted political bargains (Frieden, 1991) that preserved supply side interventions, including industrial promotion, public employment (Kurtz and Brooks, 2008) , labor protection (Carnes 2014) , and social insurance (Wibbels and Ahlquist, 2011) . In the realm of macroeconomic policymaking, I contend that the variation in policy approaches re ects the nature of a country's crisis history, with budget discipline tending to be more common in in ation-scarred countries.
Finally, these ndings have signi cant implications for the study of policymaking beyond Latin America. Diffusion scholars suggest that the prevalence of neoliberalism re ects the spread of economic orthodoxy through Western diplomacy, an Americanized global economics profession (Hall, 1993; Babb, 2001; Montecinos and Markoff, 2010) , and multilateral institutions (Barnett and Finnemore, 2004; Woods, 2006; Simmons, Dobbin, and Garrett 2008) . Recent scholarship has found that the IMF operates as a diffusion mechanism for the spread of neoliberal economists and hence neoliberal ideas, which in turn increases the likelihood of IMF preferential loan treatment (Nelson, 2014a; 2014b Employing such historical lessons is not unique to ghting economic wars. International relations schol-ars have found that major historical events often guide decision makers (Jervis 1976 , Khong 1992 , and Levy 1994 (Khong 1992) . In economic policymaking, the relevant analogies re ect historical states of the economy, with crises often being the most salient events.
In Latin America, the region's most salient historical crisis is hyperin ation. These traumatic domestic experiences helped align national economic agendas with those of international institutions and markets. In fact, previous scholarship has demonstrated that political leaders often use international tools, such as IMF conditionality, to help achieve their own domestic policy priorities (Vreeland 2003) .
I contend that the region's understanding of its in ation crisis history raised the domestic political appeal of hiring mainstream economists that promised to contain in ation through scal discipline. In the wake of these crises, the importance of price stability gained political traction over heterodox policies that had struggled to reign in runaway prices. Heterodox programs typically used price controls rather than budgetary rectitude to curb in ation, overlooking the aforementioned link between large scal de cits and in ation.
The political desire to use expansionary scal policies to redistribute income and spur development was a laudable goal in countries that had struggled with high income inequality. However, these programs were unable to break the vicious cycle of balooning de cits, booming money supply, and unbridled in ation that haunted so many Latin American governments. When governments used the printing press (or central bank nancing) to fund de cit spending, the money supply had expanded at breakneck speeds, causing prices to soar without bounds (Dornbusch and Edwards 1991). Surging in ation further eroded real tax revenues and exacerbated budget shortfalls, with governments often responding by printing more money.
Latin American hyperin ations soared thousands of percentage points higher annually, rupturing economic activity and popular incomes in a way that has been unparalleled by any business cycle uctuations since that time. By comparison, the relative success of mainstream policies in eventually taming runaway in ation boosted their technocratic saliency, particularly the importance of avoiding unsustainable de cits.
I argue that the historical lessons associated with such traumatic crises are enduring, creating sustained shifts in post-crisis technocratic composition and national approaches to budgetary management. I anticipate that such historical memories are channeled into economic policymaking through two primary channels.
The rst pathway occurs directly through political elites, where "a suf ciently acute crisis creates a consensus that the old order has failed and needs to be replaced" (see Drazen and Easterly 2001) . More speci cally, in countries where runaway in ation has eroded middle and working class incomes, political leaders are more likely to internalize the lessons of budgetary overexpansion. In such in ation-scarred countries, job creation remains a political priority, but not if it entails using aggressive scal stimulus that spurs in ation (Kaplan 2013) . A repeat of past in ation crises would carry prohibitive costs. Not only do they create grave income shocks that torpedo popular living standards, but scholars have also found that they have electoral repercussions. High in ation erodes electoral support for incumbent governments and discredits political parties (Remmer 1991; Stokes 2001; Murillo, Oliveros, and Vaishnav 2010) .
Politicians therefore use sound scal governance to keep in ation under control and convey their managerial credentials to households, businesses, and investors. In fact, in ation control has also had a steady baseline of support since the end of hyperin ation. In its survey of sixteen Latin American countries, the Latinobarómetro found that more than one-quarter of the adult population believed ghting in ation was By comparison, this paper also examines the effect of economic crises on presidential cabinets, but over a longer-term horizon. Rather than examining how critical events in uence near-term cabinet changes, it explores the role of historical memory on sustained ideological shifts in presidential economic teams.
Moreover, compared to the focus on inter-branch negotations (Negretto 2006) in the minister retention literature, I study a single policy dimension -macroeconomic policymaking.
In this dimension, the executive branch directly formulates and implements scal policy, serving as the command and control of the budgetary process (Hallerberg, Scartascini, and Stein 2009; Bonvecchi and Scartascini 2011) . Political factors that foster greater ideological diversity in the executive branch, such as left partisanship or coalitional cabinets, can certainly in uence technocratic appointments and governance.
However, given the executive branch's considerable policy discretion in mapping a country's course of scal policy, such intrabranch politics is likely to be more salient than interbranch politics. While Congress has a direct role in the budget approval stage, it often cannot change the broad counters of macroeconomic policy.
In other words, legislators can bargain over line-item spending, but new expenditures are either capped or "offset" by additional nancing sources (Hallerberg, Scartascini, and Stein 2009 ).
Past shocks may thus not only condition technocratic appointments, but also the government's scal policy stance. To avoid repeating their crisis histories, presidents appoint technocrats, or ministers with specialized training in economics. While such technocrats are often expected to apply non-partisan, professionalized approaches to decision-making, their policy preferences typically re ect a country's understanding of its economic history. In other words, politicians tend to ght past economic wars.
In the shadow of in ation crises, presidents are more likely to appoint mainstream`in ation hawks', who view scal discipline is the pathway to in ation control, rather than more`dovish' heterodox advisors, who are willing to use scal intervention to catalyze the economy and remedy job losses. These heterodox advisors are most likely to emerge after unemployment shocks at the other end of the business cycle. Indeed, when economic activity slows too markedly, unemployment can trigger social mobilization and public protests against mainstream governance. For example, Argentina, Ecuador, and Venezuela have all experienced a recent unemployment shock that raised the political saliency of job creation relative to in ation control. Unemployment reached historic highs in all three countries in the early 2000s, helping open the door to less conventional advisors that governed with greater budgetary intervention in the economy.
However, these shocks tend to be far less historically salient than in ation crises because they did not disrupt the price system, and hence the economy as severely. Their more limited saliency helps explain some recent policy reversals. In Argentina, for instance, the return of moderate in ation under President Cristina
Kirchner quickly stoked fears about the perils of runaway in ation, swinging the pendulum back towards a centrist president Mauricio Macri and a cadre of mainstream technocrats who pledged to control in ation with austerity. When a country like Argentina has suffered a dual-crisis legacy, the political lessons from 8 in ationary shocks are often more enduring. Even years after an in ation crisis, mainstream economists tend to believe that scal discipline has its merits. It not only provides businesses and investors with a stable, long run operational environment, but also protects voters' incomes.
Ironically, delivering such price stability may unintentionally create other risks. When appointments are driven by historical legacies more than by contemporaneous problems, leaders may not respond optimally to new challenges, impeding their national competitiveness. Austerity has undoubtedly helped keep in ation under control in Latin America, but it may have also sti ed growth, production, and unemployment (Blyth 2013; Stiglitz and Greenwald 2014) . It pays the most dividends at the peak of the economic cycle, when it can help curb high-growth spending sprees that might otherwise catalyze in ation or default. Without the proper economic diagnosis, however, the austerity prescription can inadvertently impair economic health.
In summary, in a region like Latin America that has exhibited considerable price volatility historically, I expect that macroeconomic governance is often a product of in ation crisis legacies. To evaluate this theoretical prior systematically, I employ the following testable hypotheses. The rst hypothesis examines the link between economic crises and ministerial appointments, while the second hypothesis assesses how crises affect scal governance strategies both directly, and indirectly through these ministerial appointments:
In ation crisis legacies tend to shape the professional composition of presidential cabinets. Following severe in ation shocks, economic teams are more likely to be comprised of mainstream (rather than heterodox) advisors compared to those countries that have not experienced extreme in ation crises.
These shocks also tend have more historical saliency than other type of crises.
H 2 : In ation crises affect scal governance both directly through greater in ation-aversion among political leaders, but also indirectly through ministerial appointments. Mainstream advisors are more likely to pursue scal austerity by improving budget balances.
Data and Methods
To test these hypotheses, we journey to Latin America, a region where the degree of economic volatility has been two to three times higher than developed countries (Maddison, 2001) . The region's volatility in large part has re ected its in ation crisis history; about one-half of its countries have experienced an in ation crisis, making it a tting environment to examine how crises affect governance. I anticipate that these crisis legacies are sticky given the severity of in ationary trauma relative to other types of domestic volatility 9 (i.e. unemployment shocks) in Latin America. I expect in ation crisis memory to affect economic policy through two different channels: a direct political effect where crisis legacies create a political incentive to pursue scal discipline by widening the constituency that favors in ation-controlled growth, and an indirect effect where presidential appointments of technocratic advisors lead to more restrained scal governance.
The empirical analysis proceeds in two stages. Employing a panel of data covering 16 democratic countries from 1961-2011 that includes a total of 225 economic ministers, the rst-stage model explores the factors driving ministerial appointments. I nd that crisis legacies are an important domestic channel that is distinct from more traditional factors in uencing the appointment process, such as regional diffusion, partisan economic ideas, and coalitional cabinets. However, other political factors may not be as observable, creating potential bias. For example, mainstream economists, working for business groups, media conglomerates, techocratic networks, and think-tanks interpret economic conditions and frame business sentiment, which can then in uence ministerial appointments (Luna and Kaltwasser 2014) . I thus attempt to account for such endogeneity in the appointment process with instruments to control for non-random selection ( American economic advisors. In additional robustness checks using an ordered probit model, I also employ the full index, M ainstream_IEA it (see Table A .1 in the online appendix), rather than the binary measure as the dependent variable, nding that the results do not materially change (see models 2 and 4 in Table 1 ).
In constructing these measures, I draw on an extensive sociology and political science literature showing that professional economics training often shapes policy preferences through socialization and diffusion.
In other words, economists often diagnose problems and offer policy solutions through the`interpretive lens' of their professional training (Hall, 1993; Dominguez et. al., 1997; Babb, 2001; Chwieroth, 2007; Kogut and MacPherson 2008; Montecinos and Markoff, 2010) . Building on these ndings, scholars have employed rich datasets on U.S. economics training as a proxy for neoliberalism (Chwieroth 2007; Kogut and MacPherson 2008; Nelson, 2014a; Nelson, 2014b) , based on the premise that neoliberal ideas diffuse from an Americanized global economics profession. Hallerberg and Wehner (2013) Table A .6 for a full listing) because these universities embody similar approaches to those that are typically considered neoliberal in the United States. In additional robustness checks, I expand the purview of the measure beyond this formal educational lter to include the professional background of key advisors, M ainstream_p it (see model 5 in Table 1 ).
Given that preferences may change over time, these tests gauge the importance of work experiences and professional networks in domestic policy formation. This coding assumes that those advisors hailing from international nancial institutions (e.g. the IMF or World Bank), global nance, or business, tend to hold liberal economic beliefs that align with mainstream thinking (section A.1.1, Table A .1 in the online appendix).
In ation Crisis Legacy I measure the duration of the in ation crisis memory in several different ways.
In the main text, I employ Drazen and Easterly's (2001) de nition of a hyperin ation crisis, speci ed as an observation two or more standard deviations above the mean. Given the prior that past shocks condition current policymaking, the binary variable (Hyperin aton legacy) classi es a country as having such a legacy after in ation returns to the historical norm (i.e. within one standard deviation of the mean).
1 if a country had a past in ation crisis 0 otherwise
In additional robustness tests, I also employ a more encompassing measure of in ation crises (In ation crisis legacy) to account for the region's variation in in ation crisis experiences that include both hyperination and`very' high in ation crises (Tables A.3 
Model Speci cation
To operationalize the hypotheses, I use the following speci cations:
where M ainstream it = mainstream ministerial orientation; where F iscal it = primary scal balance (as a percentage of GDP); where Hyper it k = hyperin ation history. The index i = country and t = year. X it = vector of control variables; F iscal t 1it = primary scal balance (one year lag); n i = dummy capturing unobserved country effects; " it = error term. For more details, see section A.1.3-4 of the appendix.
To test these hypotheses, I focus on the independent variable coef cients for Hyper it , and M ainstream it .
When M ainstream it is the dependent variable, a positive coef cient for Hyper it would support the rst hypothesis that countries with a hyperin ation legacy tend to have a higher share of mainstream economist in presidential cabinets. Similarly, when F iscal it is the dependent variable, I expect to observe a direct effect where Hyper it yields greater budgetary restraint, and an indirect effect where independent of hyperin ation's initial effect on ministerial appointments, M ainstream it also yields greater budget discipline.
Empirical Results

The Effect of Past In ation Crises on Policy Orientation
Do crisis legacies condition ministerial appointments? The rst series of probit models display the effects of the independent variables on the professional training of Latin American economic ministers. The coef cient on in ation crisis legacies is positive and statistically signi cant (at the 99 percent con dence 13 interval) across the regression models (see models 1-4 in Table 1 ). Employing these coef cients to derive the predicted probability of having a mainstream economics minister, I nd that an in ation crisis history makes a government about 35 to 38 percent more likely to appoint advisors with mainstream economics credentials compared to non-crisis periods (see models 1-3 in Table 1 ). These results lend considerable support to the rst hypothesis (H 1 ) that runaway in ation breeds scal conservatives schooled in mainstream economics.
Moreover, these ndings do not materially change when conducting an ordered probit regression with the ordinal variable instead of the probit model with the dichotomous measure (see models 2 and 4).
I also expand the de nition of a mainstream economist to include professional background (i.e. previous career experience), Mainstream_p, given the theoretical prior that experience working for the private sector, global nancial markets, or international institutions is more likely to align an advisor with a mainstream policy orientation. Employing such a more comprehensive measure (see Table A .1) did not yield any material changes in the direction our statistical signi cance of the coef cients. However, they do become greater in magnitude (see model 5), suggesting that transnational networks in global nance may also in uence the extent to which policymakers adhere to the mainstream consensus.
Does the opposite shock, an unemployment crisis, temper hyperin ation lessons? Or, do in ation crises tend to have more historical saliency than other types of crises, as expected? In the absence of an in ation crisis legacy, unemployment shocks do appear to have some saliency. The coef cient for unemployment crisis legacy is negative and statistically signi cant (model 6 in Table 1 ), suggesting that presidents are more likely to deviate from the mainstream consensus following such shocks. They tend to appoint heterodox advisors that believe heavy de cit spending can alleviate demand shortfalls and generate employment.
That said, the conditional regression model also shows that a dual-crisis legacy has a positive and statistically signi cant effect on the appointment of mainstream economists that value scal discipline and in ation control (see model 6 in Table 1 ). These ndings suggests that historical lessons from in ation crises have a more pronounced effect on ministerial appointments than those associated with unemployment crises.
The core results remain unchanged when controlling for several institutional variables, including whether a country has an IMF program, a long democratic tenure, or a left-wing government (see models 3-6 in Table   1 ). In models 7-8, we also add two more control variables to measure institutional constraints on executive power. Minority, re ects whether or not the president has a legislative minority, while Coalition measures whether the cabinet includes members of non-presidential parties. The negative and statistically signi cant coef cients for left partisanship and coalitional cabinets illustrate that greater ideological dispersion (both 14 through left governments and coalition governments) tends to breed more heterodox advisors.
While the main ndings show that historical memory is associated with sustained ideological shifts in ministerial composition, domestic political conditions also seem to play an important role. In the realm of macroeconomic policy, however, intrabranch politics appears to be more salient than interbranch politics.
The minority coef cient is statistically insigni cant, meaning that we cannot rule out the null hypothesis that legislative minorities have little in uence over the appointments of nance ministers and central bank presidents. Given the considerable discretion that presidential economic teams have in formulating and implementing scal policy, perhaps legislative minorities are more likely to in uence line-item spending debates, rather than the overall budgetary framework.
Robustness Checks
In a series of robustness checks, I nd that the correlation between past in ation crises and policy orientation is markedly resilient. First, I account for the possibility that the saliency of past crises fade over time. I modify the structure of the binary variable for in ation crisis legacy to track a shorter 20-year window (see model 7 in Table 1 ). These robustness tests do not yield any material changes to the core ndings, with the coef cient for in ation crisis legacies maintaining its precision and statistical signi cance for not only the 20 year, but also the 5 and 10 year windows. 7 Given these windows begin once in ation returns to its historical norm (i.e. one standard deviation above the mean), it is unlikely that policymakers are simply reacting to a resurgence of crisis conditions. Rather, crisis memory appears to be an important factor. 8
In a nal robustness check, I nd that the coef cient on years since crisis is also statistically signi cant, suggesting that crisis legacies appear to have an enduring effect on ministerial appointments (see model 8).
Notably, in the online appendix, I also conduct a series of tests using alternative crisis measures to allay potential concerns about the Hyperin ation legacy variable's rigidity. None of these measures, including a more encompassing measure of In ation crisis legacy, Highest past in ation, Lagged in ation (t-20 and t-30 yrs), and Lagged unemployment (t-5), change the primary results (section A.2.1; Table A.4).
The primary ndings are also robust after controlling for shorter-term in ation and unemployment issues (models 7-8 in Table 1 ). This result supports the notion that crisis legacies are often enduring, even when accounting for business cycle uctuations. If politicians from crisis-ridden countries are more likely to 7 Available upon request. 8 To ensure that crisis memory does not re ect the ideational preferences of the ministers hired to respond to the initial crisis, I removed them from the dataset in the rare case that they were still governing at the beginning of the crisis memory window. 15 appoint advisors with in ation-ghting credentials, it also suggests that they may not be heeding suf cient attention to contemporaneous economic conditions. For this reason, I also add a lagged dependent variable to control for the potential persistence of ideological minister types over time (see model 8). The coef cient for the lagged value of mainstream economists is positive and statistically signi cant, suggesting that economic ideology can be sticky. However, adding the lagged dependent variable to the speci cation does not materially change the main results.
I also control for the role of regional diffusion in explaining national ministerial appointments (model 6-8 in Table 1 ). The coef cient for regional diffusion is positive and statistically signi cant, providing support for the diffusion literature's expected regional proliferation of mainstream technocrats. This trend may in part re ect the tendency for democratic governments to appoint technocrats to improve their access to nancing (Beaulieu, Cox, and Saiegh 2012; Flores, Lloyd, and Nooruddin 2016) .
While presidents may in part choose their economic of cials based on regional trends, this pattern does not temper the domestic link between crisis legacies and ministerial appointments. The primary ndings remain robust, lending support to the notion that there is a domestic channel for ideational change that is independent of the global dissemination of ideas. Moreover, we cannot rule out the possibility that individual crisis legacies are reinforcing the regional trend toward mainstream technocrats who value in ation control.
The Effect of Past In ation Crises on Fiscal Policy Choices
The rst stage of the selection model above (see Table 1 ) shows that in ationary crises provide a window of ideological opportunity, often conditioning the type of ministerial appointments. Independent of the initial process leading to their appointment, the model's second stage (see Table 2 ) then shows that these economic of cials tend to be more scally conservative than their counterparts without formal training in mainstream economics. In models 1-4 in Table 2 , for instance, the coef cient on mainstream economists is positive and statistically signi cant, with average budget balances that are about 1 percentage point of GDP higher than their less-conventional peers. These ndings hold when controlling for institutional variables, including the age of democracy, left partisanship, and IMF programs (see models 3 and 4).
Beyond this indirect effect operating through ministerial appointments, might there also be a direct effect of crises on scal governance? The coef cients on in ation crisis legacy are positive and statistically signi cant. This pattern is in line with the historic tendency of procyclical scal spending in Latin America (Gavin and Perotti, 1997; Pinto, 2010) , where economic downturns tend to coincide with sustained periods 16 of higher budgetary constraints. I nd that the political commitment to scal discipline is prolonged by crisis memory, speci cally the severity of past in ationary shocks. Average budget balances following in ation crises tend to be 2 to 3 percentage points of GDP higher than during non-crisis periods (see Table 2 ).
For example, Brazil's 2011 primary scal surplus was more than 3 percentage points of GDP greater than the negative primary budget balance recorded that year in Venezuela, a country that had never experienced an extreme in ation shock. However, the regression estimates above imply that should Venezuela's annual in ation rate surpass 300 percent in 2016 (or more than 2 standard deviations above the historical mean) as projected by many economists, such a severe in ation crisis could trigger a period of scal consolidation where budget balances are as much as 3 percentage points of GDP higher than their pre-shock levels.
Finally, the above pattern of crisis-induced austerity holds, even when controlling for contemporaneous economic conditions, including the lingering structural effects of post-crisis in ation, the business cycle, and unemployment. Results for other control variables are also consistent with expectations. The positive and statistically signi cant coef cient for global growth suggest that improved scal balances are often correlated with better global economic conditions. At the same time, the coef cient for the lagged dependent variable, primary scal balances (t-1), has a positive and statistically signi cant relationship, implying that a history of prudent scal governance makes budget discipline more likely today.
Robustness Checks
A series of further tests show that the correlation between in ation crises and scal governance is robust. First, employing the full index of economic advisors, rather than the binary measure, as the independent variable does not materially change the primary results (models 5 and 6 in Table 2 ). Additionally, I use the more comprehensive measure of mainstream economist (i.e. education background or previous work experience) to account for the informal training that advisors likely receive when working for international nancial institutions, global nance, or international business. This robustness check did not yield any substantial changes in the direction of statistical signi cance of the coef cients for mainstream economists, or in ation crisis legacies (models 7 and 8 in Table 2 ). Finally, these results remain robust after a series of tests using the Arellano-Bond GMM estimator (models 2, 4, 6, and 8 in Table 2 ), which do not considerably alter their size, direction, or statistical signi cance. In short, these robustness tests provide considerable support for the theoretical framework, nding that crises affect scal governance both directly, and indirectly through the ideational beliefs of technocratic communities (see section A.2.2 of the online appendix).
Discussion
To further examine the extent of in uence that crisis legacies can have on ministerial appointments and governance, I extend the analysis by brie y discussing three country cases: Argentina, Ecuador, and Peru. These three countries are similar along economic and political indicators: they are presidential, high middle-income South American countries, yet the maximize the variation in the main independent variable of interest -in ation crisis legacies. Peru suffered through hyperin ation in the early 1990s, Argentina lived through shocks at both ends of the business cycle (hyperin ation and an unemployment crisis) during the last three decades, while Ecuador has never experienced hyperin ation.
The Peruvian case perhaps best illustrates the saliency of crisis memories on policy making, given that a single political leader, Alan García, served presidential terms before and after the country's in ation crisis. Table 1 ; models 5-8 in Table A .4), the in uence of unemployment shocks appears to fade with time relative to in ation crises. Under the Kirchner administration, a reemergence of in ation pressures during her second term triggered the public's in ation sensitivity and punctured her popularity, eventually contributing to the election of centrist president Mauricio Macri and his technocratic team. While Argentina's unemployment shock had temporarily raised the saliency of job creation in the mid-2000s, hyperin ation casts a longer policymaking shadow because of its devastation to both the price system and the overall economy.
Even Cristina Kirchner had appointed a mainstream economic minister, Martin Lousteau, early in her term amid ongoing concerns about devaluation-induced in ation.
What happens to governance in countries without in ationary scars? For example, Ecuador's in ation has not breached 100 percent per annum over the last half century. Without historical lessons to constrain de cit spending, Ecuador's policy is conditional on commodity booms and busts. During booms, a negative correlation coef cient ( 0:40) for terms of trade and mainstream advisors suggests that presidential advisors tend to be heterodox, which is in line with the regional trend (see models 1-2 in Table 1; Table A .4).
They also tend to oversee wider scal de cits. For example, during its boom years, the Rafael Correa administration posted an average primary scal de cit of almost 3 percent between 2007-2014. More recently, however, the oil market downturn has sparked spending cuts and tax hikes by Correa's new MBA-toting nance minister Fausto Herrera. It took a commodity shock to propel Correa toward austerity. Without the sustained saliency of hyperin ation lessons, however, it's unlikely that Ecuador's austerity push would persist during an oil-price recovery.
Conclusion
The effect of past crises on policymaking communities is impressive. Employing an originally constructed data index, dubbed the Index of Economic Advisors, cross-national statistical tests in 16 Latin American countries from 1960 to 2011 show that scal governance is conditioned by in ation shocks through both a direct and indirect effect. Presidents from countries with in ation-crisis legacies are more likely to prioritize scal sustainability within their overall agenda. They also appoint considerably more mainstream technocrats to presidential teams (see Figure 1) , who then tend to govern with greater discipline than their non-crisis peers. These severe crises often cast a long shadow over policymaking, with budgetary restraint enduring even after the business cycle shifts toward slower growth and higher unemployment.
With such a shared professional training, it's not uncommon for public discourse to center on scal prudence and in ation control, even in a country like Brazil where the Rousseff administration experimented with micro-level heterodoxy (i.e. using off-balance sheet nancing from the Brazilian Development Bank to fund industrial expansions). Recent nance ministers, including Henrique Meirelles, Nelson Barbosa, and Joaquim Levy, have still emphasized "long-term scal adjustment", 10 " scal stability", 11 and "in ation vigilance." 12 In line with these policy goals, and despite some recent scal drift, the Brazilian government has averaged a primary budget surplus of more than 1.5 percent of GDP over the last two decades.
However, such a sustained austerity focus suggests that Brazilian technocrats may be too in uenced by their in ation crisis history. Given the extent of the Brazilian recession, some economists would argue that scal stimulus, not restraint, is better at boosting economic growth. For example, according to Keynes, "the boom, not the slump, is the right time for austerity" (Blyth 2013) . During the 2008 nancial crisis, even the United States, the global champion of austerity, stimulated its own economy to exit the recession.
Similarly to Brazil, neighboring Argentina had also placed disproportionate weight on its crisis past, relative to contemporary economic conditions through much of the 1990s and early 2000s. Its political leaders unleashed a team of technocrats, brandishing mainstream economic credentials from the University of Chicago to Harvard University, to wage its war on hyperin ation. They maintained a stringent commitment to scal discipline under the country's convertibility law for more than a decade after the crisis had subsided.
The enduring focus on in ation control neglected the country's growing lack of competitiveness, and helped sow the seeds for the 2001-02 debt crisis. Indeed, the drawback of governing through a historic lens is that a lingering political focus on past crises can limit policy exibility today.
In conclusion, the ndings offer important new insights for the political economy literature, demonstrating the key role that both transformative national events and key economic advisors often have in shaping policy choices. This paper also offers a new and innovative dataset that measures the policy orientation of Latin America's key economic advisors, which can bene t many different types of future research endeavors that examine the effect of ideational factors on such national policy choices as privatization and the funding of social spending, military expenditures, and development. Finally, from a policy perspective, these ndings also point to the potential risks of ghting the last economic war, which can leave governments captives of history and misguided ideological paradigms, and thus unable to respond to new economic challenges. 
